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Abstract—Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is an intelligent application
of IoT in smart transportation, which can make intelligent deci-
sions for passengers. It has drawn extensive attention to improve
traffic safety and efficiency and create a more comfortable driving
and riding environment. Vehicular cloud computing is a variant
of mobile cloud computing, which can process local information
quickly. The cooperation of the Internet and vehicular cloud can
make the communication more efficient in IoV. In this paper,
we mainly focus on the secure communication between vehicles
and roadside units. We first propose a new certificateless short
signature scheme (CLSS) and prove the unforgeability of it in
random oracle model. Then, by combining CLSS and a regional
management strategy we design an efficient anonymous mutual
quick authentication scheme for IoV. Additionally, the quan-
titative performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme
achieves higher efficiency in terms of interaction between vehicles
and roadside units compared with other existing schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, the Internet of Things (IoT) is widely used in various
areas, including smart transportation, smart grid, smart health,
etc. Internet of Vehicles (IoV) [1] is one of the revolutions of
IoT. It develops from Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs).
VANETs cannot make intelligent decisions due to lacking
the capacity of processing, analyzing, and evaluating global
information collected from vehicles and infrastructures. In
contrast to VANETs, IoV integrates vehicles, human, things,
and networks as an intelligent unit via network technologies
including deep learning, fog computing, cloud computing, etc.
Relevant scholars have proposed several reference models
on IoV, such as three-level model [2], four-level model [3],
and five-level model [4]. The four-level model was proposed
by CISCO in 2013, as shown in Fig. 1. It mainly consists
of vehicles, roadside units (RSUs), personal devices, and
sensors. Various communication scenes in IoV are summa-
rized in Fig. 2: Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Roadside
unit (V2R), Vehicle-to-Personal devices (V2P) and Vehicle-
to-Sensors (V2S). This kind of hybrid communication model
could provide more convenient and intelligent services in IoV.
The real-time connection between vehicles and IoV networks
makes services more reliable and secure.
As an emerging paradigm, mobile cloud computing (MCC)
is a branch of cloud computing for mobile Internet. In [5],
Gerla proposed a new computing model based on MCC for
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Fig. 1 Four-level system model for IoV
vehicles—mobile vehicular cloud computing. Vehicles and
RSUs often have three kinds of resources including data
storage, sensors and computing. The interconnection of these
resources and Internet establishes a vehicular cloud to provide
intelligent service. For instance, vehicles pick up emergency
road situation, and upload it to the vehicle cloud server.
Finally, the cloud server reminds the relevant vehicles to notice
the breaking information. Vehicle could upload global and
constant contents to the Internet. It will decreases the event
processing delay. All operations are based on the cooperation
of vehicular cloud, public cloud, private cloud, enterprise
cloud, and big data analysis, which make IoV more intelligent.
Many previous works provide the technical basis for IoV
[6]–[18]. However, IoV still faces many challenges [19]–[23].
Security threats and privacy issues have been more and more
crucial in IoV. If an attacker impersonates a vehicle to send
fake messages, it may affect traveling routes of other vehicles.
By now, many researches on the security of IoV [24]–[26] have
been presented. Besides security concern, privacy preservation
is another crucial requirement. It should prevent attackers from
obtaining user’s private and sensitive information, such as the
user’s real identity and location. However, if any vehicle is
compromised, the trusted authority should be able to track it
from relevant information. So, anonymity in IoV should be
conditional.
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Fig. 2 Various communication scenes in IoV
Because of combing the merits of certificateless cryp-
tosystem and short signature, certificateless short signature is
suitable for recourse-constrained IoV scenario. In 2007, Huang
et al. proposed the first certificateless short signature scheme
and the security model [27]. In 2013, He et al. [28] proposed
an efficient scheme with better performance than the previous
schemes.
In this paper, we mainly focus on the privacy preserving
secure access issue in IoV. Considering the aforementioned
conflicts and challenges, we propose an efficient anonymous
authentication scheme for IoV. The main contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows:
• The proposed scheme provides conditional anonymous
mutual authentication and privacy preservation.
• A concept of regional management for roadside units is
introduced. RSUs in the same region can work together
to complete the verification of vehicles.
• Compared with the previous schemes, our scheme is more
efficient in terms of computational overhead.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, IoV scenario model and some preliminaries are introduced.
Then, a certificateless short signature (CLSS) is proposed. In
Section IV, an anonymous authentication scheme for IoV is
proposed based on CLSS. The security analysis and perfor-
mance evaluation are given in Section V. Finally, Section VI
concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the IoV scenario model,
security model, and design objectives.
A. Scenario Model
A typical scenario model for IoV is illustrated in Fig. 3. It
mainly consists of TCC, TBA, vehicles, and RSU.
• TCC (Transportation Control Center): TCC is in
charge of initializing systems, enrolling all entities in IoV,
collecting data from RSU, tracking malicious vehicles,
and maintaining revocation list.
• TBA (Trace Back Authority): TBA is responsible
for receiving relevant information of dishonest vehicle,
confirming malicious behavior and implementing corre-
sponding punishment.
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Fig. 3 A Typical IoV Scenario
• Vehicles: Each vehicle in IoV is equipped with an OBU
that can periodically send relevant road safety information
to other vehicles and RSUs through wireless channels.
In addition, it can receive and report the other OBUs’
messages in a multi-hop way.
• RSU (Road-Side Unit): RSUs are the fixed road infras-
tructures deployed on road-side. RSUs generally commu-
nicate with TCC through wired channel. They are respon-
sible for collecting, uploading and distributing real-time
traffic information. Because RSUs can manage messages
in their ranges, so they can act as gateways and provide
wireless services for OBUs.
B. Security Model
In general, a CLSS contains six parts: Setup, Partial-Private-
Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Public-Key, Signing, and
Verification. We assume that there are two types of opponents
to try to attack CLSS based on the ability of the master key: AI
can replace any user’s public key without the master key; AII
can obtain the master key, but is unable to replace any user’s
public key. It will be proved that our scheme is existentially
unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and ID attacks
for two adversaries in random oracle model.
To prove the security of CLSS, we assume the following
hard problems:
Definition 1. The k-bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion (k-
BDHI) Problem: Given two groups G1 and G2, and a gen-
erator P of G1, a (n+1)-tuple (P, αP, α
2P, ..., αnP ) ∈ Gn+11 ,
compute e(P, P )α
−1
.
Definition 2. The k-Collision Attack Algorithm (k-CAA)
Problem: Given a fixed and known integer k, and a (2k+2)-
tuple (t1, t2, ..., tk, P,Q = sP,
1
t1+s
P, ..., 1
tk+s
P ) ∈ Zkq ×
Gk+21 , output a pair (A,c) such that A =
1
c+sP .
C. Design Objectives
The design objectives of our scheme are described as
follows:
• Anonymous authentication: Anonymous authentication
is an efficient approach to protect vehicle’s privacy. The
proposed scheme should be able to verify if the traffic in-
formation is released by legitimate vehicles. Furthermore,
it should prevent attackers from obtaining vehicle’s actual
identity.
• Conditional Privacy Preservation: If vehicles follow the
scheme honestly, their privacy should be protected very
well. On the contrary, if dishonest vehicles deliberately
release fake messages, TCC should be able to disclose
their real identities.
• Non-reputation: OBUs and RSUs cannot deny that they
have distributed the relevant traffic information.
III. AN IMPROVED CERTIFICATELESS SHORT SIGNATURE
In this section, we propose an improved CLSS as an essen-
tial cryptographic primitive for our anonymous authentication
in IoV.
A. System Setup
Key generation centre (KGC) first initializes the whole
system as follows:
- KGC takes the security parameter l as input, and outputs
cyclic additive group G1 and multiplicative group G2
with same order q, and a bilinear map e : G1×G1 → G2;
- KGC selects a generator P ∈ G1, a random system
master key s ∈ Z∗q , and computes the system public key
Ppub = {Ppub1, Ppub2} = {sP, g
s}, where g = e(P, P );
- KGC chooses three one-way hash functions H0 :
{0, 1}∗ × G2 → Z
∗
q , H1 : {0, 1}
∗ × G1 → Z
∗
q ,
H2 : {0, 1}
∗ × {0, 1}∗ ×G1 ×G1 → Z
∗
q .
Next, KGC publishes params = {G1, G2, H0, H1, H2, P,
Ppub, q, g, e} as the system parameters and keeps system
master key s in secret.
B. Set-Secret-Value
A signer chooses a random number x ∈ Z∗q as its secret
value, and computes PKID1 = g
x−1 as its partial public key.
C. Partial-Private-Key-Extract
KGC chooses a random rID ∈ Z
∗
q , and computes RID =
rIDP , sID = (h0rID − h1s) mod q, DID = (RID, sID),
where h0 = H0(ID, PKID1), h1 = H1(ID,RID). Then, it
sends DID to the signer via a secure channel.
The signer can verify DID via the following equation:
H1(ID,RID)Ppub1 = H0(ID, PKID1)RID − sIDP
D. Set-Private-Key
The signer sets SKID = (x,DID) as its private key.
E. Set-Public-Key
The signer sets PKID = {PKID1, PKID2, PKID3} =
{gx
−1
, RID, x
−1P} as its public key.
F. Signing
The signer signs a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ using its private
key SKID as follows:
- Compute h2 = H2(m, ID, PKID2, PKID3);
- Compute σ = (xsID + h0h2)
−1(P + xPpub1) as the
signature on m;
- Send σ to the verifier.
G. Verification
On receiving the signer’s identity ID, public key PKID,
message m, and the corresponding signature σ, the verifier
does the following steps:
- Compute h0 = H0(ID, PKID1), h1 = H1(ID,RID);
- Compute h2 = H2(m, ID, PKID2, PKID3);
- Verify the equation Ppub2 · PKID1 = e(σ, h0PKID2 −
h1Ppub1+h0h2PKID3). If it holds, the signer is authen-
ticated; otherwise, the verification fails.
The correctness of the scheme is proved as follows:
e (σ, h0PKID2 − h1Ppub1 + h0h2PKID3)
= e((xsID + h0h2)
−1(P + xPpub1), h0PKID2 − h1Ppub1
+ h0h2PKID3)
= e((h0rID − h1s+ x
−1h0h2)
−1(x−1 + s)P, (h0rID − h1
s+ h0h2x
−1)P )
= gs+x
−1
= Ppub2 · PKID1
H. Security Analysis of CLSS
The proposed CLSS scheme is secure under adaptively
chosen-message and ID attacks in random oracle model. The
security of the CLSS scheme relies on k-BDHI and k-CAA.
The security proof of our scheme is similar to the scheme [29],
[30]. Due to the page limitation, we omit the full proof and
will give the detailed security analysis in the future work.
IV. ANONYMOUS AUTHENTICATION SCHEME FOR IOV
Based on the proposed CLSS, we design an anonymous
authentication scheme for IoV.
A. System Initialization
Given the security parameter l, TCC generates the system
public key Ppub = {Ppub1, Ppub2} = {sP, g
s} and private key
s according to the method in Section III. Then, it chooses
five one-way hash functions H0 : {0, 1}
∗ × G2 → Z
∗
q , H1 :
{0, 1}∗ × G1 → Z
∗
q , H2 : {0, 1}
∗ × {0, 1}∗ × G1 × G1 ×
G1 → Z
∗
q , H3 : {0, 1}
∗ → Z∗q , H4 : {0, 1}
∗ × {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q .
Next, TCC chooses an encryption algorithm based on elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC) and a message authentication code
function MACkey(·). At the same time, TCC maintains and
updates two lists: one is the legitimate user list Lslu, and the
other is revocation list of illegal users Lsrb.
TCC publishes params = {G1, G2, H0, H1, H2, H3, H4,
P, Ppub, q, g, e} as the system parameters.
B. Registration
RSUs and OBUs submit their registration requests to TCC
respectively. Each OBU or RSU in IoV has its own identity
ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ that is unique and is stored into the tamper-proof
device of it.
1) OBU Registration: An OBU chooses a random xo ∈ Z
∗
q ,
computes its partial public key PKID1o = g
x−1
o , and then
sends the registration request message req = (IDo, PKID1o)
to TCC. Then, TCC chooses a random rIDo ∈ Z
∗
q , and
computes RIDo = rIDo · P , sIDo = (h0rIDo − h1s) mod q,
DIDo = {RIDo, sIDo}, in which h0 = H0(IDo, PKID1o),
h1 = H1(IDo, RIDo). Finally, TCC sends DIDo to the OBU
via a secure channel.
The OBU sets SKIDo = (DIDo, xo) as its private key and
keeps it in secret. Then, it uses its private key to compute
partial public key PKID3o = x
−1
o P , and sets PKIDo =
{PKID1o, PKID2o, PKID3o} = {g
x−1
o , RIDo, x
−1
o P} as its
public key.
Verification on DIDo: OBU verifies DIDo by
H1(IDo, RIDo)Ppub1 = H0(IDo, PKID1o)RIDo − sIDoP .
If the equation holds, the OBU accepts DIDo as its partial
private key; otherwise, the OBU rejects the partial private key
and aborts.
After completing the registration of the OBU, TCC adds
relevant information to Lslu.
2) RSU Registration: On receiving the registration request
req = IDR from a RSU, TCC computes h3 = H3(IDR),
DIDR =
1
h3+s
P , and sends DIDR to RSU via a secure
channel.
Verification on DIDR: RSU verifies DIDR by
e(DIDR, H3(IDR)P + Ppub1) = g. If the equation
holds, RSU accepts DIDR. Then RSU applies to TCC for
revocation list Lsrb.
C. Report Uploading
This process can be divided into two phases: pseudonym
generation and report signing.
1) Pseudonym Generation: In this part, we introduce a
concept of regional management for RSUs. RSUs in the same
area are equipped with the same public/private key pairs. TCC
periodically generates public/private key pairs, and issues them
to RSUs within its range via a wireless secure channel.
When a vehicle enters a new area, it will receive the
broadcasted public key from a RSU. If the vehicle wants to
enjoy the service provided by this RSU, it needs to send a
access report to the RSU. Then, it utilizes the public key to
generate a pseudonym f = Epk(r‖IDo) from user’s each
report r.
2) Report Signing: OBU performs the following steps to
complete report signing:
- Obtain a current time stamp T ∈ {0, 1}∗;
- Choose a random t ∈ {0, 1}∗, compute PK ′IDo =
{PK ′ID1o, PK
′
ID2o, PK
′
ID3o} = {th0PKID1o,
tPKID2o, tPKID3o}, P
′
pub1 = tPpub1, and broadcast
PK ′ID1o and P
′
pub1 to the other entities within its range;
- Compute the following equations:
h0 = H0(IDo, PKID1o) (1)
h1 = H1(IDo, RIDo) (2)
h2 = H2(r, T, f, PK
′
ID2o
, PK ′ID3o) (3)
r1 = (t · h0)⊕ h2, r2 = (t · h1)⊕ h2 (4)
- The signature on report r is calculated as follows:
σ = t−2(xosIDo + h0h2)
−1(P + xoPpub1) (5)
- Send the service request message Req =
(T, f, σ, r, r1, r2) to RSU.
D. Mutual Authentication
The RSU can verify the OBU’s identity IDo and report r.
Similarly, OBU uses the message authentication code function
with the shared session key to authenticate RSU.
1) RSU Verifies OBU: On receiving the service request Req
from OBU, RSU first checks the validity of the time stamp T .
Then, it authenticates OBU as follows:
- Compute h2 = H2(r, T, f, PK
′
ID2o
, PK ′ID3o);
- Compute h′0 = r1 ⊕ h2, h
′
1 = r2 ⊕ h2;
- Verify the signature via the equation Ppub2 · PK
′
ID1o =
e(σ, h′0PK
′
ID2o − h
′
1P
′
pub1 + h
′
0h2PK
′
ID3o) · h
′
0.
2) OBU Verifies RSU: In contrast, OBU also needs to
authenticate RSU.
- RSU uses its private key to decrypt OBU’s pseudonym:
(r‖IDo) = Dsk(f). Next, it extracts OBU’s identity
IDo. Then, RSU retrieves IDo in Lsrb. If Lsrb contains
IDo, the authentication and service are terminated. After
obtaining OBU’s real identity, RSU computes hIDo =
H3(IDo), key = H4(hIDo, IDR), mac = MACkey
(hIDo), and sends the message authentication code mac
to OBU;
- Upon receiving mac from RSU, OBU computes
h′IDo = H3(IDo), key
′ = H4(hIDo, IDR), mac
′ =
MACkey′(h
′
IDo
), and checks if mac′ is equal to the
received mac. If both values are equivalent, RSU is
authenticated.
E. Vehicle Tracking
If a vehicle broadcasts the false message, the prosecutor will
send the vehicle’s service request message Req to TBA. TBA
first confirms whether the vehicle is malicious. If the vehicle
has malicious behavior, TBA sends the request message Req
and relevant evidence to TCC. Then, TCC can reveal real
OBU’s identity as follows:
- TCC finds the corresponding RSU that provides service
for the dishonest vehicle according to the vehicle loca-
tion information provided by TBA.
- TCC obtains the exact time of the dispute by checking
the time stamp T in the service request message Req.
- TCC finds the public/private key pair (pk, sk) that the
dispute used. Then, it computes Dsk(f) = (r‖IDo).
- RSU extracts the OBU’s identity IDo from Req.
- TCC adds the dishonest vehicle identity IDo into the
revocation list Lsrb, and updates it.
- TCC sends the malicious vehicle’s identity to TBA
via a secure channel. Then, TBA records the dishonest
vehicle’s behavior and implements corresponding pun-
ishment.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security properties of the
anonymous authentication scheme in the following respects.
1) OBU Anonymity: In our scheme, the OBU’s real identity
is converted into the pseudonym f = Epk(r‖IDo) that is not
managed by any third party. The report r makes each OBU’s
pseudonym one-time, so adversaries cannot distinguish if two
different pseudonyms come from a same vehicle. Moreover, it
is intractable for adversaries to reveal OBU’s actual identity
without RSU’s private key sk. Furthermore, the public key of
a vehicle would be different after multiplied by a random t,
so none of the public keys can be linked to the same vehicle.
In the proposed scheme, any third party cannot obtain
OBU’s real identity, so our scheme realizes the anonymity
of the OBU.
2) Non-repudiation: OBU cannot deny the behavior of sub-
mitting some messages, because the service request message
Req includes OBU’s pseudonym f . RSU can discover OBU
actual identity by computing Dsk(f) with its private key.
Therefore, non-repudiation property is satisfied.
3) The Security of Session Key: In our scheme, the session
key is a hash value that combines OBU’s real identity with
RSU’s identity. The security of the session key depends on the
security of OBU’s identity. According to the aforementioned
analysis, we find that OBU’s real identity is secure. Therefore,
the proposed scheme can guarantee that no third party can
obtain the session key.
4) Mutual Authentication: RSU can authenticate OBU by
verifying the CLSS signature of OBU. In our scheme, only
OBU and RSU know OBU’s real identity IDo, so the session
key key = H4(hIDo, IDR) is only shared between OBU and
RSU. OBU can verify RSU by checking if the computedmac′
is equal to the receivedmac. Therefore, mutual authentication
between the OBU and RSU is achieved.
5) Resistant to Replay Attacks: In our scheme, current time
stamp T ensures the freshness of reports. On receiving the
OBU’s service request message Req, RSU first checks if the
time stamp T is expired. If it is, RSU rejects to accept the
OBU’s request. Thus, our scheme can resist replay attacks.
TABLE I Running Time of Basic Operations
Operations Time(ms)
Pairing 11.88
Map-To-Point 23.34
Multiplication 10.06
Exponentiation 10.09
TABLE II Comparisons on Computation Overhead
Schemes Sign Verify Map-To-Point
HHC [28] 1H+1M 1H+2PP+2M YES
HTH [31] 2H+2M 3H+4PP+1M YES
THSW [32] 1H+1E 1H+4PP YES
CCL [33] 1M 1H+2PP+2M YES
Our Scheme 2M 1PP+3M NO
HHC[28] HTH[31] THSW[32] CCL[33] Our Scheme
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B. Performance Evaluation
Due to lack of completely similar schemes for comparing,
we briefly test the essential cryptographic operations instead
of the whole scheme, which will not distort the results if
performance evaluation. We compare our scheme with four
existing schemes [28], [31]–[33] via experimental simulation.
The simulation environment is Linux Ubuntu 16.04 LTS on
an Intel Atom N450 1.66GHz × 2 processor. We list the
running time of the basic cryptographic operations in Table
I. Table II shows the comparisons on computation overhead
among different schemes. Let M denote multiplication in G1,
H denote the Map-To-Point operation, PP denote the bilinear
pairing in G1, and E denote the exponentiation in G2.
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Fig. 5 Time consumption on verification vs. the number of
vehicles
In the signing phase, our scheme only requires two scalar
multiplications in G1. In the phase of verification, it requires
one pairing operation and three scalar multiplications. Fig.
4 shows the time consumption on signing, verification and
total time of these schemes. Our scheme takes the least time
overhead. Fig. 5 shows the trend of the time consumption
on verification with the increase of the number of vehicles.
When a large number of vehicles enter the RSU’s range, our
scheme can provides quicker verification compared to the other
schemes.
Based on test experience, in general, the energy overhead
on communication is only about one-thousandth or less of that
on computation, so the communication overhead is ignored in
the assessment process. Therefore, as a whole, our scheme
achieves better performance than the other selected schemes.
It is more suitable for IoV scenarios.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an anonymous mutual authen-
tication scheme based on a certificateless short signature
for the vehicles and RSUs in IoV. The scheme is existen-
tially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack in
random oracle model. The security analysis shows that the
proposed mutual authentication scheme can simultaneously
achieve privacy preservation and traceability of vehicles, that
is conditional anonymity. Moreover, compared to the existing
schemes, our scheme has lower computation overhead and
achieves higher efficiency. So it is an efficient conditional
anonymous authentication solution for IoV scenes.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work is supported by Natural Science Basic Research
Plan in Shaanxi Province of China (No. 2016JM6057), the
111 Project (B08038) and Collaborative Innovation Center of
Information Sensing and Understanding at Xidian University.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Gerla, E. K. Lee, G. Pau, and U. Lee, “Internet of Vehicles: From
intelligent grid to autonomous cars and vehicular clouds,” in Proc. of
IEEE World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT), 2014, pp. 241–246.
[2] N. Liu, “Internet of Vehicles: Your next connection,” Huawei WinWin,
vol. 11, pp. 23–28, 2011.
[3] F. Bonomi et al., “The smart and connected vehicle and the Internet of
Things,” in Proc. of Workshop on Synchronization in Telecommunication
Systems (WSTS), 2013.
[4] O. Kaiwartya, A. H. Abdullah, Y. Cao, A. Altameem, M. Prasad, C. T.
Lin, and X. Liu, “Internet of Vehicles: Motivation, layered architecture,
network model, challenges, and future aspects,” IEEE Access, vol. 4,
pp. 5356–5373, 2016.
[5] M. Gerla, “Vehicular cloud computing,” in Proc. of the 11th Annual
Mediterranean Ad Hoc Networking Workshop (Med-Hoc-Net), 2012, pp.
152–155.
[6] X. Du and F. Lin, “Maintaining differentiated coverage in heterogeneous
sensor networks,” EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and
Networking, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 565–572, 2005.
[7] Z. Su, Q. Qi, Q. Xu, S. Guo, and X. Wang, “Incentive scheme for cyber
physical social systems based on user behaviors,” IEEE Transactions on
Emerging Topics in Computing, 2017.
[8] X. Du, Y. Xiao, H. H. Chen, and Q. Wu, “Secure cell relay routing
protocol for sensor networks,” Wireless Communications and Mobile
Computing, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 375–391, 2006.
[9] Y. Xiao, V. K. Rayi, B. Sun, X. Du, F. Hu, and M. Galloway, “A survey
of key management schemes in wireless sensor networks,” Computer
communications, vol. 30, no. 11-12, pp. 2314–2341, 2007.
[10] Y. Hui, Z. Su, and S. Guo, “Utility based data computing scheme to
provide sensing service in internet of things,” IEEE Transactions on
Emerging Topics in Computing, 2017.
[11] X. Du, Y. Xiao, M. Guizani, and H. H. Chen, “An effective key man-
agement scheme for heterogeneous sensor networks,” Ad Hoc Networks,
vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 24–34, 2007.
[12] X. Huang, J. K. Liu, S. Tang, Y. Xiang, K. Liang, L. Xu, and J. Zhou,
“Cost-effective authentic and anonymous data sharing with forward
security,” IEEE Transactions on computers, vol. 64, no. 4, pp. 971–983,
2015.
[13] Y. Xiao, X. Du, J. Zhang, F. Hu, and S. Guizani, “Internet protocol
television (iptv): the killer application for the next-generation internet,”
IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 45, no. 11, pp. 126–134, 2007.
[14] X. Du, M. Guizani, Y. Xiao, and H. H. Chen, “Secure and efficient time
synchronization in heterogeneous sensor networks,” IEEE transactions
on vehicular technology, vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 2387–2394, 2008.
[15] F. Hu, X. Cao, and C. May, “Optimized scheduling for data aggregation
in wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. of International Conference on
Information Technology: Coding and Computing, 2005, pp. 557–561.
[16] X. Du and H. H. Chen, “Security in wireless sensor networks,” IEEE
Wireless Communications, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 60–66, 2008.
[17] J. Zhang, X. Chen, Y. Xiang, W. Zhou, and J. Wu, “Robust network
traffic classification,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 23,
no. 4, pp. 1257–1270, 2015.
[18] X. Du, M. Guizani, Y. Xiao, and H. H. Chen, “A routing-driven elliptic
curve cryptography based key management scheme for heterogeneous
sensor networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications,
vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 1223–1229, 2009.
[19] Y. Wang, S. Wen, Y. Xiang, and W. Zhou, “Modeling the propagation
of worms in networks: A survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys &
Tutorials, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 942–960, 2014.
[20] S. Yu, G. Gu, A. Barnawi, S. Guo, and I. Stojmenovic, “Malware
propagation in large-scale networks,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge
and Data Engineering, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 170–179, 2015.
[21] S. Yu, G. Wang, and W. Zhou, “Modeling malicious activities in cyber
space,” IEEE network, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 83–87, 2015.
[22] S. Yu, S. Guo, and I. Stojmenovic, “Fool me if you can: Mimicking at-
tacks and anti-attacks in cyberspace,” IEEE Transactions on Computers,
vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 139–151, 2015.
[23] K. Manandhar, X. Cao, F. Hu, and Y. Liu, “Detection of faults and
attacks including false data injection attack in smart grid using kalman
filter,” IEEE transactions on control of network systems, vol. 1, no. 4,
pp. 370–379, 2014.
[24] J. Liu, S. Zhang, W. Sun, and Y. Shi, “In-vehicle network attacks
and countermeasures: Challenges and future directions,” IEEE Network,
vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 50–58, 2017.
[25] W. Sun, J. Liu, and H. Zhang, “When smart wearables meet intelligent
vehicles: challenges and future directions,” IEEE wireless communica-
tions, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 58–65, 2017.
[26] D. B. Rawat, M. Garuba, L. Chen, and Q. Yang, “On the security of
information dissemination in the Internet-of-Vehicles,” Tsinghua Science
and Technology, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 437–445, 2017.
[27] X. Huang, Y. Mu, W. Susilo, D. Wong, and W. Wu, “Certificateless
signature revisited,” in Proc. of Information Security and Privacy.
Springer, 2007, pp. 308–322.
[28] D. He, B. Huang, and J. Chen, “New certificateless short signature
scheme,” IET Information Security, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 113–117, 2013.
[29] R. Tso, C. Gu, T. Okamoto, and E. Okamoto, “Efficient ID-based digital
signatures with message recovery,” Cryptology and Network Security,
pp. 47–59, 2007.
[30] S. Cui, P. Duan, C. W. Chan, and X. Cheng, “An efficient identity-based
signature scheme and its applications.” International Journal of Network
Security, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 89–98, 2007.
[31] Y. H. Hung, Y. M. Tseng, and S. S. Huang, “A revocable certificateless
short signature scheme and its authentication application,” Informatica,
vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 549–572, 2016.
[32] R. Tso, X. Huang, and W. Susilo, “Strongly secure certificateless short
signatures,” Journal of Systems and Software, vol. 85, no. 6, pp. 1409–
1417, 2012.
[33] Y. C. Chen, G. Horng, and C. L. Liu, “Strong non-repudiation based on
certificateless short signatures,” IET Information Security, vol. 7, no. 3,
pp. 253–263, 2013.
